

CPEC, the driver of globalization and positive peace: an Inquiry through Kashmir dispute

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Abstract

This study explores that CPEC is the mega driver of globalization and instrument of soft balancing and can bring economic equilibrium through development and interconnectivity to bridge parity in soft power between Indian and Pakistan, which has been mega impediment of positive peace. The study at hand had tested the framework of International Economic Leverage and Its Uses, to understand the nature, magnitude and layers of Sino-Pakistan Interdependence and its implications to maintain regional balance in South Asia and address the impasse between India and Pakistan. The study reveals that regional connectivity in the shape of CPEC carries economical leverage to bring quantum of parity between India and Pakistan which can bring fourth chance as potent catalyst to address the Kashmir Issue. The degree of interdependency will have multi dimensional spillover effects, if OBOR is extended and developed in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It has natural passage through AJ&K, via Khunjerab, along Neelam River having a natural junction with Srinagar Rawalpindi Road at Domail, Muzaffarabad. This route has been connecting Srinagar through trade and travel since 2008, through LoC. The paper suggests that It leads to a logical sequence, where the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir from both sides of LoC is declared as 'free economic zone in five phases', keeping speedy driver of globalization in the shape of OBOR in consideration. It will be mega Kashmir centric CBM and a major catalyst of conflict resolution.

Introduction

Kashmiris are lynching for 70 years as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. They have paid heavy human costs for implementation of the UNSC resolutions. The devised human rights and humanitarian laws vis-à-vis UNSC resolutions to bring positive peace in South Asia proved feeble in imbalance of Indian sub-continent. There are examples that where major powers take the notice of gross human rights violations and the entire scene changes. For instance, when USA dictated peace in Kosovo, East Timor and South Sudan and brought the desired outcome, of peace (Chamey, 2001) because powerful actor entered in scene which balanced and dictated peace.

It is imperative to bridge the gap in peace making demands equilibrium in influence and CPEC is a chance to unlock the dilemma of equilibrium at least at south Asian level on the saddles of interregional connectivity, having tremendous potential to boost economy and international influence. Regional connectivity is a potent catalyst to bring equilibrium at regional level because three major nuclear powers of South Asia; India, Pakistan and China are bordering neighbors, where CPEC can prove beneficial to all. Kashmir is divided between India, Pakistan and China. Pakistan is the legal party to Kashmir dispute, as per UNSC resolutions 22 Jan 1948 (Wellens, 1990). The part of Kashmir that gained freedom in 1949 (Saraf, 2004), namely Azad Jammu and Kashmir, is the base camp of resistance of Indian Kashmir. However, 2/3rd of the state is under Indian occupation since 1948, governed by article 370 of Indian constitution (Noorani, 2011). The UNSC framework could not be put to practice as India resisted all external influence, therefore, the question of Kashmir kept hanging in this game of power and politics. Though, Pakistan, UNSC (Hassan, 2015),

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international Humanitarian laws, Human rights laws, laws of basic and civil rights, favor Kashmir's right to self-determination (Chesteman, 2002). The utter failure of international community to interpret international Human rights law adds complexity of dispute. The instant routes, i.e. three wars between India and Pakistan failed to yield desired results. Kashmiris have invested four generations since the past 70 years in demand for the rights of self-determination, but India paid no heed to heavy human cost paid by the Kashmiri people, but kept augmenting the size of hard power required to cement occupation (Khan, 2016). The core of the strategy of the mega actor India, was to keep International community at bay and to dissolve mass uprisings by diluting the article 370, the special status of Kashmir, (Noorani 2016) which governs the state under Indian constitution. India has always defended gross human rights violation, placing the blame of encouraging Kashmiri rebels and thus, provoking the issue while aggregating the miseries.

Shift of Power balance, favorable to solution of Kashmir or implementation of UNSC resolutions has been observed thrice in entire conflict history once when mega powers moved resolution in UNSC, vetoed by Russia, and the second time in 1962 when China engaged India (Calvin, 1984). Testing of nuclear warheads by India followed by Pakistan had balanced the equilibrium, but increased the threat of a nuclear war, hence, this equilibrium favored the status quo. On Indian side "Hindutva" is driving force of "Hindu talbnisation" or saffron terror (Gittinger, 2011), which radicalizes Indian politics and therefore makes it difficult for minorities to survive in India particularly the biggest Muslim population including peaceful resolution of Kashmir conflict. The multi-disciplinary studies show how equilibrium in various fronts, is vital to achieve legal and political rights,

Soft laws or the green rights (Chinkin, 1989) have little utility if not backed by power. Though International Humanitarian, Human rights laws and right to self determination as basic rights are clearly crafted to prevent future wars, which is the primary principal of United Nations, but power interprets these laws and stretches them beyond their maximum limit yet keeps them confined (Koffman, 1956). India has a liberal democratic face, but apparently driven by ideology. She promotes the human right while launched hybrid war by fueling Baluchistan there after hilted the Indus water treaty and launching diplomatic offensive. Officially India gives no heed that there is deference between internationally legal disputed and the domestic conflicts. She has brushed aside the International humanitarian and human rights laws.

This study adds in existing knowledge that regional connectivity will bridge the gap while maintaining equilibrium will have some impact to resolve the Kashmir conflict, Otherwise the present third generation laws have no utility to protect the fourth generations of Kashmir (Bakers, 1994).

Literature Review

Balance in power (Earnest, 1993) is the ultimate goal of foreign policy (Home, 1739). As great Thucydides said, "Strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must". Pakistan tried its utmost to balance the power with India, but due to its limited resources, has been failing from 70 years. Pakistan tried its utmost to settle Kashmir dispute; while the resolution of the problem through UNSC resolutions and international laws were on weaker scale, but failed none the less to implement UNSC resolutions as to stop the killings of 97,000 Kashmir's and its four generations from the game maker India. In quest of implementation of UNSC resolutions as framework to resolve the conflict, Kashmir paid a heavy human costs and Pakistan has been kept hostage. India always applied the traditional balance of power theory, which now has some serious challenges. In post cold war, when USA emerged as sole actor of uni-polar world (Pape, 2005) and Pakistan entered in nuclear

era, in its quest to balance the power, Pakistan would have failed to resolve the longest pending dispute, though USA favored Islamabad's position on Kashmir issue till 2003.

Soft balancing of power is started by economic, diplomatic and intuitional methods. The trade between China and India was 71,6 billion in 2015 while the trade between China and Pakistan was calculated to be 19 Billion in the same year. It can create new economical equilibrium. Pakistan had to put some responsibility upon all, whether friends or foes, to devise a regional and international policy to push the arrangement of resolution of Kashmir issue by linking economical channels with diplomatic and institutional ones. China emerged as third party to Kashmir dispute since 1963 with the boarder arrangement with Pakistan. Beijing defended the position of Pakistani at various occasions that Kashmir shall be resolved as per wishes and aspirations of Kashmiri people. China has dealt with the Kashmir Issue in the South Asian context; however, it has kept an eye on the sensitivities of India. The Position of China over Kashmir remained consistent in support of Pakistan, but never adopted the clear cut position about the gross human rights situation in Kashmir. China supported Pakistans position in the UN, but never pushed the solution of the Kashmir issue up to the quantum, which could have provoked India.

Zhoe Elahi declined the invitation of Jawahir lal Nehru to visit Kashmir in 1956, to maintain that it may give notion that China supports Indian position. From 1960-1970, China maintained the calculated silence on the Kashmir Issue. Mr. Vajpayee's visit in 1979 brought a slight thaw from China on the Kashmir policy and Mr. Deng Xiaoping issued a statement in 1980, that India and Pakistan shall resolve Kashmir issue bilaterally, which was a mega shift to see the Kashmir dispute through bilateral paradigm suited the statuesque. China took a bold step in 2009 and stamped the Visa to Kashmiris under Indian control on plain paper, maintaining that since Kashmir is disputed territory, therefore, Indian passport is not a required document for Kashmiris to travel to China. Chinese Foreign minister and Spokesman, Mr Zhaoxu, added its gravity that the Chinese policy to issue loose Visa to Kashmir's is constant and remains unchanged. China did not issued Visa to Indian Lt.Genral B.S Jaswal, maintaining that since he was involved in genocide of Kashmiri people in Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir and served as core commanded of 15th core stationed in Srinagar. China played a vital rule in 2001, after the parliament attack, when India mobilized half million troops and brought nuclear capable missiles near the border to deescalate the tension. Chinese Vice President Hi Yafei took lead rule in 2008 in post Mumbai attacks. Beijing advised against Islamabad position in 1990 to convene UN special commission on Kashmir. During Kargil crisis China urged India and Pakistan to respect LoC and resume negation for peaceful settlement of Kashmir as per Lahore Deceleration. China opposed the draft statement of India in BRICS Oct.2016, carrying notion to isolate Pakistan diplomatically. In post massive uprising after Sep, 2016 Chinese foreign ministry (Kangs, 2016) issued a statement that Beijing was concerned about the casualties in the clash. China's position remained balanced and cautious, however, China seemed reluctant give any external power an edge in the India and Pakistan affairs, which was suitable to the Indian position to keep Kashmir away from International radar and confined in bilateralism. CPEC changed position in favor of Pakistan as it will give China the strategic edge besides the economical one. There is clear shift that sole regional power, mega economy of the world and mega actor in the race of global power, China, needs to be benefitted from Pakistan firstly in a larger frame work.

The unilateral dependency will change in interdependency. The economic concept of balancing was conceptualized by Richard N Cooper, which was modified in international relations by Robert Cohan and Joseph Nye who stated that in international relations that states fortunes are tied together by economy and international relations is transformed by interdependence. Pakistan had opportunity to get allied with regional power is lone route to

bring balance. There have been a lot of literature available about peace however peace by equilibrium, peace by empire and peace by disequilibrium had empirical evidences. (Raymond Aaron, 2006). During this study, The “International Economic Leverage and Its Uses, (Knorr Klaus) is put in practice in given conditions of Kashmir to achieve the peace with the difference that in that CPEC will bridge an south Asian equilibrium which is pre requisite while as economic independency alone have little scope in Indo-Pak context.

Theoretical Framework

India and Pakistan have failed to shrink differences from seventeen years because proper understanding of friction among the nuclear powers was having diverse interpretations. Same is argued by Neo-liberalist, Kenith. Waltz, in his book “Man State and War”, that peace cannot be achieved without proper understanding of war. Pak-India wars could not be prevented which dented Pakistans sovereignty. War results from selfishness, from miss directed aggressive impulses, from stupidity (Waltz, 1959). India, as a South Asian hegemon, (Levy et. al, 2005) is calling most of the shorts in the region. India breached sovereignty of Pakistan in 1971, followed by Siachin in 1984, keeping international community at bay, despite International laws being on the side of the oppressed. Indian Prime minister is now keeping an eye on Baluchistan, and has threatened Pakistan to back off from the support of Kashmir.

India handles Kashmir by might. She dilutes peace internationally while bringing question of Indian sovereignty in play, wounding the sovereignty of Pakistan. It supports Cynthia Wiber theory, that power will pass order because there is no international government (Wiber, 2005). There is strong connection between International theories and everyday life ,and how to theorize the trauma of the Kashmiri people is a mega challenge ,however, when “sole power” was injured during 9/11 ,all tables were turned around. The construction of the trauma from global networks becomes the hot subject of international relations (Antz and Lambek). The trauma of the powerful transformed in to its own constructivism resulted the genuine struggle of right to self determination and Kashmir went off back burner, because to address the trauma of power there was shift in policies.

Although, USA had been supporting the implementation of United Nations resolutions, It had been USA’s official policy to declare Kashmir as a disputed territory, though India is sensitive to accept the disputed nature of Kashmir. UNSC resolutions and the International law provide frame work for the resolution of the Kashmir issue, but failed to bring the regional power on table. The International law dimensions analyzed in detail in an book ,“Kashmir dispute an international law perspective”, (Hassan, 1991) mentions in conclusion, while referring to the Article 39 of UNSC, that India ceases the adjudicative process on the grounds of non-justifiability of political corrector, therefore, questions international nature of Kashmir dispute with reference that the parties have agreed on bilateralism ,“Shimla agreement”, though it was eroded by India itself. India not only supported the militant rebellion, Mukti Bahahani, but captured Siachin in 1984. Denting the sovereignty of Pakistan is endorsed by present Prime Minister of India, Mr Narendra Modi, during his speech in Dhaka in 2016. Who violated and who is beneficiary, the powerful interpretation only prevailed.

Kegley maintains that the rules means nothing without the “power of enforcement” ,therefore, war and injustice are international problems ,and hence need collective efforts to address them (Kegley, 1995). Kashmir can’t be resolved by Pakistan alone or on the bases of consuming four generations and bringing new generation on the streets with stones in hand. It needs to address the gap in true saga Kashmir, In India, Pakistan, regional and International context. There are other variables having global significance. Hardit and Nagris (Shaw, 2002) raise questions that do imperialists still exist? And what does this mean for the state,

sovereignty and international order. The quasi-imperial states still exist in the shape of India denying the IHL, IHRL and UNSC resolutions, because it has the power, and there is no equilibrium in power with Pakistan who supports UNSC resolutions. Kashmir is now oscillating between interpretation of international sovereignty and International society, and demands cautious optimism. Here in Indian context, "Hindutava" is the ideological posture of Narendra Modi behaving in bad organization.

The liberalist, Walker, (Walker, 1993) argues those leaders who put rules and laws to temper conflict and facilitate cooperation are not seen in Indian context, though, apparently it is said to be a democratic country. It halted any and every international Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and the UNSC resolution, and is even reluctant to accept any outside mediation or facilitation. This is the reason why, we adopted regression analysis approach to study the ideological connotation of Indian Prime minister, Mr. Narendra Modi, establishing the fact that Indian doctrine is strictly based on Chiankian philosophy of classic realism. Idealism gives the departure, which lay foundations of this study that war can be avoided by eradicating the anarchical conditions that encourage it, through cooperation which is empirically pervasive (Keglay, 1995).

The doctrine of great American, Wilson, (Keglay, 1993) gives exit: Let people be given the rights to self-determination, to decide how and whom they will be governed by, is only solution to put to end the bloodshed which humanity is made to suffer. Neo-idealists maintain that leaders are the face of the country and the institutional expression, therefore, the statement of Mr. Modi cannot be looked in isolation in which he threatened Pakistan to use water as weapon to compromise IWT. Though constructivism (Onuf, 1889) gives the relief that what states do, what their interest are, identities and interest change but when the same prism is applied in Indo-Pak conflicts, there changed nothing, so this theory is not relevant. The ideas of the conflict resolution can be resolved through the intuitionism like UN, but it did not work in the India-Pakistan context to utilize its framework. Identity practice and politics is post modern notion, but it does not give any framework in particular setting so the gap is still there.

Therefore, the era of classical liberal principals becomes neoliberal expressions of globalization. Here is the departure point of this study that though present regime of India who chased the traditional "Hinduism while cashing Hindutava is the radical posture of India, and came in power on the shoulders of Hindu extremist ideology, but economy is still meeting point of India, simultaneously followed by China and Pakistan. It strengthens the argument of Deleuze (Gautarri, 1987), that power is not located in any one place any more, rather it flows through states. It will bring economic liberalization in the region. The connection of CPEC with Srinagar will not dent Indian interests, and can be catalyst to boost its economy if it joins CPEC, however, in both cases, whether she joins or maintains distance, the process of Globalization can't be ceased unilaterally by India when mega economy China is on board. The trade diminishes the conflict which is adopted by Mark J.C as theoretical frame work of this study while applying person's correlation between variables of Kashmir conflict.

Data Collection

Mixed method qualitative and quantitative had been applied. Primary data had been collected from field research and Secondary sources such as published data inform of books, research articles, and reports are used to maintain the validity. For quantitative data collection, primary data had been assimilated.

Likert scale had been used and data had been fed to SPSS. Data collected from respondents of people living along the line of control from both sides of divide who crossed to this side by

Chakotti and same had been feed to SPSS to measure the responses of CPEC extension in to AJK and IOK.

More the involvemnt of China in the region more would be impact upon bringing Kashmir in global lime light.

The fig-1 is an indicator of the responcees collected from from the both sides of LoC. More the chinese involmnt in Pakistani affairs more will Kashmir issue on global radar, 21% strong response and 40.67% positive response followed by the luke warm reponce 5% sets the direction of an indication that CPEC is positivly taken as game changer in Kashmir context .26.00% person disagreed and 8% did not showed any response. See Fig. 1




Figure-1

There is meager diffrence in the responcees and the relationship when same question had been asked to selected personalites of India and Pakistan, as 32.67% agree from India while as 63.33% of Pakistan were of opinion that there would be formadable impact upon the confillict of the Kashmir by devolping the bonds of relation among the divided parts of the Kashmir while as 17% strongly agreed in Idia with but 4% were having an opinion of not at all but 14% were mum on the subject.

Correlation between CPEC and bridging the gap between India and Pakistan

The parson’s correlation test had been carried to study the responses between the masses of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Indian IoK. To examine what is response of the masses living on each side of the Kashmir in order to know whether people see it an alternative route to address the Kashmir issue and whether there is any relationship and what is response of the principal party who are principal party to dispute. See Fig-2

Table 1: Correlations

	Extension of CPEC to Azad Jammu and Kashmir	Bridging the gaps between India and Pakistan
opening of other routes along LoC	1	.896(**)
Bridging the gaps between dived Kashmir	.896(**)	1

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), N: 150. Fig-2

The CPEC has significant correlation with the bridging of the gaps between India and Pakistan two divided parts hence it will decrease the degree of the distress between India and Pakistan in broader context. The significance 0.01 is strong when correlation is 2 tailed. The hypothesis is tested in the context of economic Mark J.C as theoretical frame whether trade diminishes or enhances conflict. "r" represents the value and "n" is no the sample size from India and Pakistan.

Conclusion

When more than two regional actors like Pakistan and China including 42 countries who are beneficiaries of OBOR initiative back CPEC. Under these circumstances when it happens along the borders, India has no alternative, either to join it while endorsing the compulsions of globalization or endorse the political and economic influence of China having direct relationship with Jammu and Kashmir. The economic interest will lead bandwagoning of China and Pakistan to buck passing and Chain gagging which will bridge a regional equilibrium. The actor who is weak will seek economical interdependence for political interests.

Recommendations

- 1) CPEC shall be extended via Kunjrab to Neelam Valley up to Chakotti along line of control which connects Srinagar Rawalpindi Road. It will enforce the cease fire of 2004 and will secure the areas which are under Indian fire vis-à-vis will uplift AJ&K people comically with sense of security.
- 2) Gilgit Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be declared free economic zone as CPEC passes through GB which is elsewhere princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
- 3) Pakistan and China in the region can ponder upon in later stage to declare entire state of Jammu and Kashmir as free economic zone when Azad Jammu and Kashmir will be economically stable

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