

Peacebuilding Process and Consociational Model of Power Sharing: The Case of Afghanistan

Akbar Ali^a and Muhammad Mushtaq^b

Abstract

Peace building process in Afghanistan has attracted much scholarly attention. The social scientists have suggested alternative remedies for this turbulent state to bring peace and political stability. This study attempts to contribute to the ongoing efforts for devising a workable power-sharing mechanism for ensuring inclusive governance and enduring peace in Afghanistan. The paper examines the suitability of consociational model of power-sharing for peace-building process in the case. The evidence suggests that the suitability of this model for Afghanistan is contestable owing to the largely absence of favorable conditions for the model and the traditions of adversarial and non-accommodative behavior of the Afghan elites. The paper suggests that the strength of consociational model as a peace building device varies across the cases and it is not a workable solution for all conflict-ridden societies

Introduction

For the last three decades, poorly governed, politically turbulent, and ethnically disjointed Afghanistan has been a troublesome nation state of the Asian region. After the USSR's withdrawal in 1989, it was divided into various political and ethnic groups. Several Afghan factions were engaged in self-imposed civil war. Thus, the devastation of social, economic and political structure of society was the apparent phenomena in the country. The executive structure had also been disturbed and the country remained deprived of an elected central government. After the collapse of two respective regimes Najib Ullah's USSR BACKED puppet government and the Sibghat Ullah Mujaddedi's Regime (1992-96), the newly emerged faction the 'Taliban' headed by Mullah Muhammad Umar, controlled the country through power. Since their emergence in 1994, the Taliban ruled Afghanistan from Kandahar to Kabul that constitutes almost 90% of Afghanistan.

October 2001 proved to be a turning point in the Afghan's turbulent history. Washington accused her of being a safe haven **for** Osama Bin Laden, the alleged master-mind behind the September 11 attacks on the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York. Subsequently, Afghanistan was invaded by the U.S. led armed forces. The main objectives of this assault were to break the Al-Qaida network and to make the Taliban government ineffective. The Taliban government was toppled on 12th November 2001. Resultantly, Afghanistan witnessed another episode of violence and conflict.

The Bonn Agreement of 2001 and **the** subsequently adopted constitution of 2004 could not bring peace and political stability in Afghanistan. Violence and conflict sustained during the Karzai period (2004–14) as well. The political **hostility** and unrest in Afghanistan has attracted considerable attention of the constitutional experts and social scientists. To bring peace and **harmony** among the rival ethnic groups, a variety of power sharing arrangements were suggested (Heuvel, 2009). The constitution of 2004 adopted centripetal power-sharing arrangement that **proved** unsuccessful in bringing peace and harmony in war-torn Afghanistan. The post-Karzai

^a M.Phil. Scholar, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Gujrat, Pakistan

^b Associate Professor, Department of Political Science & International Relations, University of Gujrat, Pakistan

period witnessed another power-sharing arrangement when Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah joined hands for political stability in the state. Ashraf Ghani took over the charge of President, and Abdullah Abdullah assumed the office Chief Executive. Unfortunately, this power sharing pact has proved fruitless as violence continue to increase in several parts of the country.

Using this backdrop, this study attempts to examine the utility of Consociational power-sharing as a peace building mechanism in Afghanistan. It has been proclaimed that Consociational power sharing is quite relevant for bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan (Tahiri, 2014). Additionally, it has been warned that the majoritarian democracy would prove catastrophic owing to the ascendancy of majority groups in a fragmented society. Therefore, it is anticipated that Consociational model would be a viable option to manage conflicts (Maley, Consociationalism and Afghan political order, 2015). Thus, this paper attempts to determine the suitability of Consociational power-sharing model in case of Afghanistan.

Consociationalism and Peace-building Process in Afghanistan

Consociationalism outlines a model of power-sharing that enables the plural societies to practise democracy and peace. Arend Lijphart has presented four characteristics of this model: (a) Executive power-sharing through political accommodation of all groups; (b) Distribution of political representation and resources among the substantial groups on basis of proportionality; (c) Provision of territorial or group autonomy; (d) and the right of veto for minority groups concerning the vital issues (Lijphart, 1977; McGarry and O'Leary, 2006; Wolff, 2011). Primarily, this model was prescribed as remedy for divided societies to practise democracy. But, recently this power-sharing model has been recommended to maintain peace and order in post-conflict societies such as Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and Iraq (O'Leary, 2005). The advocates of power-sharing model have proclaimed that **the** utility of this model varies across the countries. The model is more successful in such societies **that** witnessed long-term power-sharing experiences owing to the accommodative behavior of the political elites. **It has also** been argued that the presence of certain factors contributes to the establishment and maintenance of consociational practices. Building on this argument, this study examines the relevance of consociational model in case of Afghanistan by appraising the behavior of Afghan political elite towards power sharing agreements. Furthermore, it gauges the viability of **the** model **by** evaluating the availability of favorable factors for Consociational governance in the Afghan society.

Assessing the favorable conditions for consociationalism in Afghan society

Lijphart (1996) has identified nine conditions that contribute to the maintenance and successful conduct of consociational power-sharing arrangements. This section investigates the presence or absence of these conditions in case of Afghanistan. The score for nine favorable conditions is assigned on the findings of this section. This quantification **will** help to determine the extent to which this model would sustain and flourish in Afghanistan. Finally, through a comparative analysis **of** the previous cases of consociational democracy it will be asserted whether **or not** consociationalism would be a viable option for Afghanistan to practise **peaceful** and stable democracy.

No Majority Segment

The first favorable condition for the success of consociational power-sharing is the absence of a cohesive majority group in the relevant society. It has been argued that presence of a solid majority group is the major obstacle for successful application of consociational model (Lijphart, 2008). One of the reasons for failure of consociational model in case of Cyprus was considered the presence of a protestant majority. The multi-ethnic society of Afghanistan comprises seven

major groups i.e. Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Aimaqs, Turkmen, and Baluchis (Barfield, 2001). In addition, relatively smaller groups such as Qirghiz, Nuristani, Arabs, and Hindus are based in certain regions of Afghanistan. The Pashtuns are **the** largest group that constitutes approximately 42 % of **the** Afghan population (Barfield, 2011; Katzman, 2014). Among other notable ethnic groups, Tajiks are 25%, Hazaras (Shiite minority group) 10%, and Uzbeks nearly 10 % (Katzman, 2014).

Table-1: Ethno linguistic Groups in Afghanistan

Ethno-Linguistic Groups	Pashtuns	Tajiks	Hazaras	Uzbeks	Aimaqs	Turkman	Balochi
Percentage	42%	25%	10%	10%	4%	3%	2%

Source: (Bare field, 2011; Katzman, 2014; Lamer, 2001)

Although Pashtuns are the largest group, they are internally divided on the regional and tribal grounds. Equally, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks are divided along linguistic, territorial and political lines (Abubakar, 2012; Rahi, 2015). This composition of Afghan society seems to suggest that the case passes first criterion for establishment of Consociational democracy owing to the absence of any cohesive majority group.

Segments of Equal Size

Lijphart (1985) has considered the absence of noticeable differences in size of different segments of the society as a favorable condition of consociational model. Generally, the societal inequalities, if exist, lead the elites and **the** masses toward the non-cooperative behavior. On the contrary, if the groups are in roughly equal in size, the chances for political accommodation will be higher (Lijphart, 2008). As it has been argued that the Pashtuns are internally divided on the regional and tribal grounds, it seems that the case does pass this criterion as well.

Small Number of Segments

Lijphart (1977) argues that a society having small number of segments is more suitable for the consociational arrangements. At first, Lijphart considered three or four segments fit for the establishment of consociational power-sharing. However, in the subsequent writings, he suggested three to five segments as a favorable base for this model. Lijphart (1977) opines if a society has plurality of segments, then cooperation among groups will be difficult to create. On the other hand, it will be easier to create the sense of cooperation **in a society having a small number of segments**. The demographic data on Afghanistan seems to suggest that there are four larger segments. The smaller segments having less than 5 % of the population are insignificant enough to exclude from the analysis. So, it appears that the Afghanistan case fulfills this requirement adequately.

Small Population Size

The small population size of a country is also considered a favorable condition for Consociationalism (Andeweg, 2000). Lijphart (1985) argues that in case of small population size, the political elites have personal interaction with one another. Therefore, the decision-making process is easier in smaller rather than in the larger countries. The western European Consociational cases had small population size that enabled them to experience consociational democracy successfully. Hence, the population size is an influential factor that, directly or indirectly, plays a great role for the successful establishment of this model of power-sharing. Lijphart maintains that the small size of the country engenders the spirit of co-operation among **the** elites of the state. It also reduces the burden of decision making and this reduction leads a country to the successful maintenance of consociationalism (Lijphart, 1985). Afghanistan has a medium population size. Its population is approximately 33 million and it is the 41st populous country in the world. Although, Afghanistan is more populous in comparison to numerous

consociational cases, its population size does not appear to be an obstacle to the successful application of consociational arrangements. It is safer to argue that the population size of Afghanistan neither undermines nor favors the consociational arrangements.

External Threats

The proponents of consociationalism have considered existence of external threats to a state a favorable factor for successful establishment of consociational democracy. Lijphart (1977) argues that owing to external threats, the feelings of vulnerability and insecurity emerge among the masses. Therefore, they demonstrate internal solidarity under these circumstances. He argues that the political elites of such externally threatened states tend to join hands and their followers also try to engender internal cooperation. It can be argued that the World Wars partly contributed to the politics of accommodation experienced in the consociational regimes of Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland.


Shah (2012, p.20) has reported that “the contemporary history of Afghanistan shows that it has been at the center of various internal and external encounters and upheavals”. It has served as battlefield for gruesome rivalries of certain empires. Owing to this phenomenon, Afghanistan has constantly remained under the external threats. In this background, it is safe to categorize this situation as supportive for Consociational power-sharing.

Socio-economic Equality

Lijphart (1996) argues that the absence of the socio-economic disparity is the most favorable condition for successful application of consociationalism. It has been argued that the socio-economic inequality leads to the demand for redistribution that produces challenge for elite cooperation” (Andeweg, 2000, p, 522). The available data on Afghanistan suggests significant regional imbalance and the obvious economic differences between urban and rural areas of Afghanistan (Montgomery & Rondinelli, 2004; Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index [BTI], 2014). But the regional disparities partially confirm inequalities among the groups as most of the groups are not territorialized.

Geographical Concentration of Segments

Geographical concentration of segments promotes the chances of success for consociational power-sharing. Lijphart (1977, p.88) has argued that “the clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility”. In case of Afghanistan, some groups such as Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Baluchis are geographically concentrated in certain regions of the country. But, in general, these groups are geographically dispersed in Afghanistan. The geographical dispersion of certain groups of Afghanistan illustrated in the following figure seems to suggest that this favorable condition is missing in this case.



The accommodative and compromising behavior of the political elites is strongly conducive to the successful establishment of consociational arrangement (Lijphart, 1996). It has been argued that the coalescent rather than adverse behaviors of the political elites lead the country towards a stable democratic set up (Lijphart, 1977). The evidence seems to suggest that tradition of elite accommodation is missing in case of Afghanistan. For instance, after the USSR's withdrawal in 1989, Afghanistan witnessed the failure of the power-sharing arrangements due to the non-accommodative behavior of the political elites. Hence, this favorable condition for consociational power-sharing is absent in the case of Afghanistan.

Overarching Loyalties

It has been emphasized that the overarching loyalties while managing diverse forces, "produce cohesion for the entire society or for particular segments" (Lijphart, 1977, p, 81- 82). For example, the overarching loyalties in Netherlands had united the Dutch Catholic and Calvinist subcultures. Lijphart (1985) has argued that in divided societies, if the mutual division of groups is counterbalanced by the sense of overarching loyalties, this factor will be more supportive to the consociational arrangements. An analysis of the Afghan society suggests the absence of overarching loyalties. The Afghan society is divided along regional, tribal, and ethnic lines. Although, Islam is the religion of clear majority in Afghanistan, the society is heterogeneous in its character (Schetter, 2005). As the case lacks the sense of overarching loyalties, consociational arrangements do not seem relevant in Afghanistan.

Comparative analysis of favorable conditions

The investigation concerning the availability of favorable conditions for consociational power-sharing in Afghanistan enables us to estimate the aggregate score assigned to the case on our subjective but careful assessment. We have used five-point scale for quantification such as 2, 1, 0, -1, and -2. For each favorable condition, we have assigned score based on our subjective judgment according to the criteria defined here. We have assigned 2 for strong presence of the condition, 1 for moderate presence of the condition, 0 for neither presence nor absence of the condition, -1 for opposing condition, and -2 for most adverse condition. After quantification of favorable conditions, we have compared the case with several cases of consociationalism. Borrowing data for other cases from Lijphart, we have compared Afghanistan to assess the relevance of Consociationalism to the case in the following table. The table reveals that mostly the favorable conditions are missing in the Afghanistan.

The aggregate score of Afghanistan is significantly better than the failure case of Consociationalism, the Cyprus. But, it is closer to Malaysia, South Africa, and Belgium. The literature on Consociationalism illustrates that all these cases practiced consociational model of power-sharing at certain point of time in their national history. However, it far less than the successful case of Switzerland. Therefore, the analysis of favorable factors does not confirm the suitability of this model of power sharing in Afghanistan

Table-2: Favorable factors of Consociationalism: Afghanistan in comparative perspective

Sr. No. Conditions	South Africa	Belgium	Cyprus	Lebanon	Malaysia	Switzerland	Afghanistan
No majority segment	+2	-1	-2	+2	-1	-1	1
Segments of equal size	+1	+1	-2	+1	-1	-2	1
Small number of segments	-1	0	0	-1	+2	+2	1
External threats	0	0	-2	-2	0	0	1
Small population	+1	+2	0	+2	+2	+2	0
Socioeconomic equality	-2	-1	-1	-1	-2	+1	-1
Geographical concentration of segments	-1	-1	+1	-1	-1	+2	-1
Tradition of elite accommodation	0	+1	0	+2	+1	+2	-2
Overarching loyalties	+1	0	-1	0	0	+2	-1
Total Score	+1	+1	-7	+2	0	+8	-1

Assessing the elites' behavior and viability of consociational institutions in Afghanistan

It has been argued that the role of political elites is vital for the successful power-sharing arrangements in plural societies. Mushtaq (2011, P. 156) argues that an analysis of the behavior of "political elites towards power sharing-arrangements (their conduct with coalition partners and respect for the mutual agreements) can establish a base for any policy recommendation about consociational democracy". To determine the relevance of Consociational power-sharing within the multi-ethnic society of Afghanistan, this section examines the conduct of Afghan political elites towards certain power-sharing arrangements during the period of 1992-2015. The behavior of political elites during Sibghat Ullah Mujaddedi Regime (1992-96) and the post-Taliban regime (2001-2015) will be discussed in following sections.

The conduct of Afghan political elites during the Sibghat Ullah Mujaddedi Regime (1992-96)

After the USSR's exit in 1989, Afghanistan was gripped by severe round of civil wars. For the peace-building and political stability, the Mujahedeen entered an alliance and signed the Peshawar accord in 1992. This power-sharing accord was signed by numerous Afghan Mujahidin factions except the Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. It was agreed that a transitional council headed by Sibghat Ullah Mujaddedi will assume power in Kabul. "After initially appearing to concede the agreement Hekmatyar dissented and refused to travel to Kabul with the rest of the council members along Mujaddedi (Qassem, 2013, pp. 91-92). According to the Peshawar accord, Mujaddedi was selected President for two months only. Subsequently, Rabbani assumed the power in June 1992 for four months. It was agreed that presidential terms of Mujaddedi and Rabbani (six-months) would be followed by the elections under the constitution drafted during the interim period (Murshed, 2013). However, Rabbani was not ready to transfer the power through transparent elections. He manipulated the process by placing his supporters on the council. Therefore, most of factions boycotted the Shura constituted for the presidential election. Rabbani's presidential term was extended in December 1992 but it intensified the conflict in Kabul. (Human Rights Watch, 2001). During the Rabbani period, Hekmatyar and the Shi'a Hezb-e-Wahdat militia resisted against the government and initiated armed campaign against Kabul. In March 1993, another accord was signed by the Mujahidin to establish a broad-based Islamic government in Kabul for the period of 18 months. This power-sharing agreement accommodated Hekmatyar by appointing him Prime Minister with Rabbani as President (Clements, 2003, p. 124). The Islamabad Accord was followed by another agreement, the Jalalabad Accord. However, these agreements

could not produce everlasting peace in Afghanistan. The conflict-ridden state of Afghanistan “sank even further into anarchy as the forces loyal to Rabbani and Masood, both ethnic Tajiks, controlled Kabul and much of the northeast, while local warlords exerted power over the rest of the country” (U.S. Department of State, 2010). The outcome of power-sharing agreements during this period suggests that the conduct of Afghan political elite seems incompatible with the Consociational model of peace-building process.

Post-Taliban Power-sharing arrangements: appraising the conduct of political elites (2001-2015)

The anarchy and violence in Afghanistan resulted in **the** dramatic rise of Taliban. The Taliban were predominantly Pashtuns, mostly from the Afghan rural areas and educated from Pakistani madrassas. **They** captured Kandahar in 1994 and Kabul in 1996. It has been reported that “by the end of 1998, the Taliban occupied about 90% of the country, limiting the opposition largely to a small mostly Tajik corner in the northeast and the Punjsher valley” (U.S. Department of State, 2010). The Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001 during the US-led War against terrorism in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks on World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The then U.S. administration of George W. Bush tried “to dismantle local security structure and build a relatively strong democratic Afghan Central Government (Katzman 2015, p, 08). Resultantly, Afghanistan's first ever democratic transition was made under the Bonn agreement 2001 and a 30-member interim power sharing government headed by Hamid Karzai was established (Shah, 2012). Muzafary (2010, p.4-5) adds that “In 2001, the major ethnically mobilized military groups who used to fight each other during the civil war (1992-96) came to agree at the Bonn conference held on December 5, 2001, on a power-sharing based interim and subsequent transitional authorities”. After a quarter century of conflicts, crises and non-democratic regimes, it was a historic and revolutionary step to ensure the inclusive democratic transition in the country. Furthermore, with the ratification of the constitution of 2004, the presidential elections of 2004 and the parliamentary elections of 2005 were held under the umbrella of “The U.N-Afghan Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB)” and the new government headed by Hamid Karzai was recognized (Nasreen, 2006; Katzman, 2015). During the Karzai administration, it was tried to share power with the other segments of the state. For instance, President was from the Pashtun ethnic group while two seats of Vice President were created to accommodate two second major ethnicities (Shah, 2012). The first Vice President Ahmad Zia Masood was a Tajik while the second Vice President Abdul Karim Khalili was the representative of the Hazara ethnic group (Muzafary, 2010). Similarly, the president's executive cabinet of 2006 **was** very inclusive as members of nearly all major ethnic groups were provided representation in it. However, the groups that were not accommodated protested.

Table-3: Composition of the Executive Cabinet of 2006

Ethnic Group	Pashtun	Tajik	Hazara	Uzbek	Turkman	Baluch
Number of portfolios	11	6	5	3	1	1

Source: (Muzafary, 2010)

So, the Karzai government during its first tenure (2004-09) was challenged and opposed by the elites of rival ethno-linguistic groups. In an interview to BBC (British Broad Casting) in October 2003, Karzai stated that, “Afghanistan was tormented, destroyed, put through lots of sufferings because of the bickering, because of the in-fighting, because of the political agendas of the parties that were not national” (Katzman, 2015, p, 9). Hamid Karzai was re-elected as President of Afghanistan in 2009. However, there were certain reservations among the public about his re-

election (Maley, 2010). Sharing power with several political groups remained a challenge during the Karzai period (2004-14). The Afghan political elites remained busy in forming various alliances throughout the period. Non-cooperative and adversarial behavior remained the core feature of the political behavior.

Table-4: Pro-Karzai political factions

S. No	Party Name	Leading Elites
1	Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan (JIA)	Burhan Uddin Rabbani
2	Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA)	Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal
3	Jombesh-e-Milli Islami (JMI)	Abdul Rashid Dostum
4	Dawat-e-Islami (Sayyaf)	Abdul Rasool Sayyaf
5	Mahaz-e-Milli Islami Afghanistan	Pir Seyed Ahmad Gailani

Source: (Australian government, 2013, p, 8-13)

The aforementioned politico-religious parties supported the Karzai government. JIA of Burhan Uddin Rabbani was considered one of the largest representative factions of Afghanistan (Katzman, 2015). Its role in Northern Alliance to dislodge Taliban was important. Although Rabbani was interested in becoming the president in post-Bonn Afghan Interim Government (AIG), he accepted Hamid Karzai as the president (Katzman, 2015). HIA, of Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal, a breakaway faction of the Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) was also coalition partner of the Karzai regime and was granted considerable share in the portfolios (Katzman, 2015). In addition, the Jombesh-e-Milli Islami, of Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Dawat-e-Islami (Sayyaf) of Abdul Rasool Sayyaf, the Mahaz-e-Milli Islami Afghanistan (MMIA) of Pir Seyed Ahmad Gailani remained part of the Karzai administration.

Nonetheless, the Karzai Regime witnessed opposition from many political groups such as National Understanding Front of Muhammad Yunus Qanooni, National Coalition of Afghanistan led by Abdullah Abdullah etc. The analysis of Karzai regime suggests that polarization and fragmentation remained the core features of the Afghan politics. During the Karzai regime (2004-14), the behavior of ethno-political elites remained mainly adversarial and non-accommodative. Thus, the power sharing arrangements remained ineffective and the situation of peace and security in the country remained dismal. Even, the contemporary regime of Ashraf Ghani-Abdullah Abdullah could not ensure peace in Afghanistan even with power-sharing arrangement. The Haqqani Network and the Hizb-e-Islami are serious challenges for the establishment of democratic institutions and peace building process. So, the behavior of political elite does not seem compatible with the Consociational model of power sharing.

Conclusion

The persistent violence and unrest in Afghanistan has serious implications not only for the state but also for the entire region. Therefore, this study has attempted to contribute to the efforts for peace and political stability in the turbulent region through examining the relevance of consociational model of power-sharing that proved fruitful in some cases. However, the analysis suggests incompatibility of Consociational model of power-sharing in case of Afghanistan. This argument is based on two findings: first, the analysis of favorable conditions for Consociational model does not confirm the suitability of model; and second, the reputation and performance of power-sharing regimes are not convincing and in line with such constitutional arrangements. Therefore, this model does not seem appropriate for peace-building in Afghanistan.

References

1. Andeweg, R. B. (2000). Consociational democracy. *Annual Review of Political Science* , 3 (1), 509-536.
2. Australian Government. (2013). *Afghanistan: political parties and insurgent groups 2001-2013*. Migration Review Tribunal (MRT). Refugee Review tribunal (RRT).
3. Barfield, T. (2011). *Afghanistan's ethnic puzzle: Decentralizing power before the U.S. withdrawal*. Retrieved 05 17, 2012, from HeinOnline--90 Foreign Aff.50 2011: <http://heinonline.org>
4. Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index [BTI]. (2014). *Afghanistan country report*. Gutersloh: Author.
5. Conrad, S. (2005). *Ethnicity and the political reconstruction of Afghanistan*. ZEF Working Paper Series, No. 3, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0202-2008091124>
6. Clements, F. (2003). *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia*. California: Santa Barbara.
7. Farani, M. N. (2013). *The US exit strategy: Impact on Afghan war on terror*. Unpublished M.Phil Thesis, School of Politics and International Relations, Quid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan.
8. Ghufuran, N. (2006). Afghanistan in 2005: The challenges of reconstruction. *Asian Survey* , 46 (1), 85-94.
9. Heuvel, A. V. (2009). *The process of power-sharing: How constitutions were established in Afghanistan and Iraq after US interventions*. Unpublished M.A Theses, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands.
10. Human Rights Watch. (2001). Crises of impunity : The role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in fueling the civil war in Afghanistan. 13 (3).
11. Katzman, K. (2014). *Afghanistan: Politics, elections, and government performance*. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.
12. Katzman, K. (2015). *Afghanistan: Post-Taliban governance, security and U.S.policy*. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service.
13. Lamer, W., & Foster, E. (2011). *Afghan ethnic groups: A brief investigation*. Norfolk: Thematic Report: Civil Military Fusion Centre (CFC), Virginia.
14. Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational Democracy. *World Politics* , 21 (2), 207-225.
15. Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. New Haven: Yale University press.
16. Lijphart, A. (1985). *Power-sharing in South Africa*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.
17. Lijphart, A. (1996). The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation. *The American Political Science Review* , 90 (2), 258-268.
18. Maley, W. (2011). Afghanistan in 2010: Continuing governance challenges and faltering security. *Asian Survey* , 51 (1), 85-96.
19. Maley, W. (2015). Consociationalism and Afghan political order. In M. Centlivres-Demont (Ed.), *Afghanistan: identity, society and politics since 1980* (pp. 62-66). London: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd.
20. Montgomery, J., & Rondinelli, D. (2004). *Beyond reconstruction in Afghanistan: Lessons from development experience*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
21. Murshed, S. I. (2013). The Afghan turmoil from 1747 to 2001. *Criterion Quarterly* , 4 (4).

22. Mushtaq, M. (2011). *Consociationalism and multi-ethnic states: Post-1971 Pakistan- a case study*.
23. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan, Pakistan.
24. Muzafary, S. A. (2010). *Presidentialism in a divided society: Afghanistan 2004 - 2009*. Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Japan.
25. O'Leary, B. (2005). Debating consociational politics: Normative and explanatory arguments. In S. Noel (Ed.), *From power-sharing to democracy: Post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided Societies* (pp. 3-43.). Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
26. O'Leary, J. M. (2006). Consociational theory, Northern Ireland's conflict, and its agreement 2. What critics of consociation can learn from Northern Ireland. *Government and Opposition* , 41 (2), 249-277.
27. Qassem, A. S. (2013). *Afghanistan's political stability: A dream unrealised* (2nd ed.). Burlington, USA: Ashgate Publishing Company.
28. Rahi, A. (2015). *Afghanistan's growing ethnic and linguistic divides: Time to address them : Central asia security policy briefs # 22*. OSCE Academy. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Norway.
29. Shah, A. (2012). The post 9/11 democratization in Afghanistan: challenges and expectations. *International journal of social science and humanity studies* , 4 (1).
30. Siddique, A. (2012). *Afghanistan's Ethnic Divides: CIDOB policy research project: Source of tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A regional perspective*. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF). Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).
31. Tahiri, I. (2014). Consociational democracy in Afghanistan with lessons from Northern Ireland. *Politicus* , 1 (1), 43-53.
32. U.S. Department of State . (2010). Retrieved 13, 2017, from <https://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/afghanistan/177806.htm>
33. Wolff, S. (2011). Post-conflict state building: The debate on institutional choice. *Third World Quarterly* , 32 (10), 1777-1802.